民族习惯法的双向困境及其程序破解——基于博弈论的分析

Bi-directional Dilemma and Its Procedural Solution of Ethnic Customary Law——An Analysis Based on Game Theory

在法制统一原则下,我国民族习惯法面临着进退两难的困境:进,它面临着国家法在价值、规范与运行机制上的挤压;退,它又遭到民族地区多层次与多元社会均衡或软或硬的抵抗。只有重新解读法制统一原则,将法制统一原则拆解为实体法制统一与程序法制统一两个层次,以程序法制统一先行实体法制紧跟的策略,对现有司法程序进行局部适当调整,才能在保障国家法律与政治上的控制权的前提下,最大限度地满足国家法制统一与民族习惯法均衡有序演化的双重需要,进而真正从制度层面以极小成本解决民族习惯法的问题。

Under the principle of centralized legal institutions, ethnic customary law is faced with a dilemma to proceed or retreat. To proceed, it encounters the suppression of values, norms and operative mechanism of national law ; to retreat, it is confronted with hard or soft resistances of muhi-layer and plural society in the ethnic regions. In the reinterpretation of the principle of centralized legal institutions, it can be broken up into two dimensions： centralizing the substantive laws and centralizing the procedural laws, and the practice of the latter can go ahead that of the former. In the proper partial adjustment to the existing judicial procedures, such a strategy can meet the double need of the national centralized legal institutions and the balanced and orderly evolution of ethnic customary law to the greatest extend at the lowest cost and it can guarantee the political domination of national law at the same. What＇s more, it can further solve the dilemma of ethnic customary law in the dimension of institutionalization.