穿越“我思”的幻象——休谟对自我的解构

Going through the Illusion of “I Think”——Hume’s Deconstruction of Self

自笛卡尔提出"我思故我在"以来,近代哲学便开始以自我为逻辑始端谋求自身的反思和建构。但在近代哲学的发展中,自我并非始终处于显在而无可置疑的位置,休谟就以其对观念关系以及必然性知识的瓦解否定我思实体化和人格化的存在,进而对自我予以解构。正是在休谟的启发下,康德转向先验自我的机能化探究。

Taking self as its logical beginning, modem philosophy has been seeking for its reflection and construction since Descartes proposed ＂I think, therefore I am＂. While in the development of modem philosophy, the self is not always in a significant and unquestionable position. Hume negated the existence of materialization and personification of ＂I think＂ with its collapse of concept of relationship and inevitable knowledge so as to deconstruct self. It was just under the inspiration of Hume, Kant turned to functioning inquiry of transcendental ego.