摘要
网络广告定价影响广告主和广告媒体的收益,因此对于双方都非常重要。基于期权理论和风险规避的视角,广告主通过向广告媒体预先购买期权价值获得事后支付最小的广告成本。建立了广告主和广告媒体之间的期权定价模型,应用纳什讨价还价方法确定了最优的期权价值,确定了期权定价合同实施的条件,分析了谈判力量与期权价值的关系。研究表明:期权定价可以使广告主减少广告成本支出,能有效地制止点击欺诈和规避信息不对称性带来的风险,广告媒体可以获得额外的收益。数值算例的分析结果进一步验证了结论的有效性。
Online advertising pricing influences both advertisers and publishers' revenues. Based on option theory and risk-averse, advertiser pay ex-post minimum fees of CPM, (;PC and CPA by ex-ante purchasing an option from publisher so as to avoid uncertainty and risk. We build an option pricing model between the advertisers and publishers and determine the optimal option values using Nash bargaining approach. We identify conditions of implementation on the option contract and analyze the relationship between the negotiation power and the option value. It shows that option pricing contract brings advertisers and publishers more flexible ways of selection. The option pricing not only helps advertisers avoid higher advertising costs, but also deters effectively click fraud and avoids the risks of asymmetry information. However, publishers gain extra revenues. A numerical example demonstrates the validity of model. The results provide online advertising pricing. a new theoretical basis and decision-making method for
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
2013年第2期202-211,共10页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070
71101018)
高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20100185120024)
中央高校基本科研业务资助项目(ZYGX2010J126)
关键词
网络广告
期权定价
纳什讨价还价
期权合同
online advertising
option pricing
nash bargaining
option contract