期刊文献+

基于风险规避的网络广告期权定价模型 被引量:4

Option Pricing Model for Internet Advertising with the Risk-Aversion
下载PDF
导出
摘要 网络广告定价影响广告主和广告媒体的收益,因此对于双方都非常重要。基于期权理论和风险规避的视角,广告主通过向广告媒体预先购买期权价值获得事后支付最小的广告成本。建立了广告主和广告媒体之间的期权定价模型,应用纳什讨价还价方法确定了最优的期权价值,确定了期权定价合同实施的条件,分析了谈判力量与期权价值的关系。研究表明:期权定价可以使广告主减少广告成本支出,能有效地制止点击欺诈和规避信息不对称性带来的风险,广告媒体可以获得额外的收益。数值算例的分析结果进一步验证了结论的有效性。 Online advertising pricing influences both advertisers and publishers' revenues. Based on option theory and risk-averse, advertiser pay ex-post minimum fees of CPM, (;PC and CPA by ex-ante purchasing an option from publisher so as to avoid uncertainty and risk. We build an option pricing model between the advertisers and publishers and determine the optimal option values using Nash bargaining approach. We identify conditions of implementation on the option contract and analyze the relationship between the negotiation power and the option value. It shows that option pricing contract brings advertisers and publishers more flexible ways of selection. The option pricing not only helps advertisers avoid higher advertising costs, but also deters effectively click fraud and avoids the risks of asymmetry information. However, publishers gain extra revenues. A numerical example demonstrates the validity of model. The results provide online advertising pricing. a new theoretical basis and decision-making method for
出处 《系统管理学报》 CSSCI 2013年第2期202-211,共10页 Journal of Systems & Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070 71101018) 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20100185120024) 中央高校基本科研业务资助项目(ZYGX2010J126)
关键词 网络广告 期权定价 纳什讨价还价 期权合同 online advertising option pricing nash bargaining option contract
  • 相关文献

参考文献22

  • 1Adler M, Gibbons P, Matias Y. Scheduling spacesharing for Internet advertising [J]. Journal of Scheduling, 2002, 5(2): 103-119.
  • 2Dawande M, Kumar S, Sriskandarajah C. Performance bounds of algorithms for scheduling advertisements on a web page [J]. Journal of Scheduling, 2003, 6(4) :373-394.
  • 3齐洁,汪定伟.求解网络广告资源优化模型的改进微粒群算法[J].控制与决策,2004,19(8):881-884. 被引量:7
  • 4Aggarwal G, Feldman J, Muthukrishnan S. Bidding to the top: VCG and equilibria of position-based auctions [J]. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2007, 4368: 15-28.
  • 5Varian H. Position auctions [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25 (6): 1163-1178.
  • 6Liu D, Chen J, Whinston A. Ex ante information and the design of keyword auctions [J]. Information Systems Research, 2010, 21 (1):133-153.
  • 7Feng J, Bhargava H, Pennock D. Implementing sponsored search in web search engines : Computational evaluation of alternative mechanisms [J]. Informs Journal on Computing, 2007, 19 (1) : 137-148.
  • 8张娥,郑斐峰,刘亚旭,汪应洛.供大于求时关键字广告位拍卖保留价设计研究[J].预测,2011,30(2):40-45. 被引量:3
  • 9张娥,汪应洛.关键字广告位拍卖的收益等价性研究[J].中国管理科学,2006,14(3):92-96. 被引量:22
  • 10Athey S, Ellison G. Position auctions with consumer search [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011,126 (3): 1213-1270.

二级参考文献29

  • 1王彦,李楚霖.拍卖机制理论中的收益等价性及应用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,24(4):88-91. 被引量:8
  • 2张娥,郑斐峰,汪应洛.网络广告竞价中的在线拍卖及其竞争策略[J].系统工程,2005,23(6):115-118. 被引量:10
  • 3张娥,汪应洛.一类异质物品拍卖机制收益等价性及应用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2006,26(1):107-110. 被引量:4
  • 4竞价广告:从搜索引擎分出来的金矿[EB/OL].http://jpke.geneh.com.cn/wlyx/pdf/lw/8-5.pdf,2007-12-28.
  • 5eMarketer. Online advertising on a rocket ride[ R]. eMarketer Report, 2007.
  • 6Weber T A, Zheng Z. Paid referrals and search intermediary design [ J ]. Information Systems Research, forthcoming.
  • 7Mehta A, Saberi A, Vazirani U, et al.. AdWords and generalized on-line matching [ A ]. 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science [ C ]. Pittsburgh PA, 2005. 264-273.
  • 8Edelman B, Ostrovsky M, Schwarz M. Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: selling billions of dollars worth of keywords[ J]. American Economic Review, 2007, 97 (1): 242-259.
  • 9Varian H R. Position auctions[ J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25 (6) : 1163-1178.
  • 10Edelman B, Ostrovsky M. Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions [ J ]. Decision Support Systems, 2007, 43(1) : 192-198.

共引文献30

同被引文献45

引证文献4

二级引证文献11

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部