摘要
从风险承担激励的角度看,银行高管薪酬是影响货币政策银行贷款传导渠道效率的重要因素。本文利用中国16家上市银行2002-2012年的季度数据,使用面板模型,对高薪酬银行和低薪酬银行贷款供给对货币政策的反应进行了实证研究。结果表明,货币政策对高薪酬银行贷款供给的影响程度高于对低薪银行的影响程度,高管薪酬在银行贷款渠道中发挥着重要作用。这一结论对金融监管政策和货币政策间的关系具有重要的含义。
Bank executive compensation is an important factor for the efficiency of bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in terms of risk-taking incentive. This paper, using quarterly data of 16 listed banks in China over the period 2002-2012, employs a panel-data model to examine the effect of monetary policy on loan supply for different bank groups with heterogeneous executive compensation. The findings show that monetary policy has more effect on the banks with high executive compensation than those with low executive compensation. Bank executive compensation plays indeed a significant role in the bank lending channel. The findings have important implications for the relationship between financial regulation and monetary policy as well.
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期41-51,共11页
Studies of International Finance
基金
第52批中国博士后科学基金项目(2012M520512)
2011年教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11YJC790309)
2012年国家社会科学基金青年项目(12CJY110)
关键词
高管薪酬
货币政策
信贷渠道
上市银行
Executive Compensation
Monetary Policy
Bank Lending Channel
Listed Banks
