网络外部性下的电信业务服务质量和定价的博弈分析

Game analyses on service quality and price of telecom business with network externality

针对已有文献较孤立的关注网络外部性、多方参与以及服务质量对电信业务定价决策的影响这一不足,从用户的效用出发,推导出了网络外部性条件下的市场需求曲线,进而建立了网络外部性、企业相对市场关系、服务质量与电信业务价格之间的统一分析框架,考察了模型的均衡及其性质.结果表明:网络外部性和服务质量可以提高用户业务的支付费用并增加运营系统的利润.当网络外部性较弱时,参与企业双方同时决策意味着更优质的服务,更低的业务支付,更高的系统利润,而序贯决策则意味着决策先行者拥有先动者优势.当网络外部性较强时,服务提供商先行决策可以带来更优质的服务,更高的业务支付和系统利润,但作为决策追随者的运营商可以利用优质服务改善价值获取,获得后动者优势.

Focusing on the ignorance of co-impacts of network externality, other participants and service quality on telecom business price equilibrium, this paper derives the demand curve from consumers＇ utilities in the market with network externality. Then, establishes a unified analytical framework of telecom network externality, relative market relation, service quality and price, and makes further analysis about model equilibriums. The results show that both network externality and service quality increase the consumers pay and the profits of the operating system. When network externality is weaker, the decision-making simultaneously between service provider and telecom operator means even better services, less expenditures, and higher system profits, while the sequential decision-making means the first-mover advantage for the first decider. When network externality is stronger, service provider makes decision firstly can bring even better services, more expenditures and higher system profits. As a follower, operator can improve its value acquisition of the business, obtain after-mover advantage through service-enhancement.