具有联盟结构的限制合作博弈的限制Owen值

Restricted Owen value in restricted games with coalition structure

具有联盟结构的合作博弈中,针对任意优先联盟不一定形成可行联盟的情况,通过引入一种格结构,研究了各优先联盟以优先约束形式进行合作时的收益分配问题.首先,将经典的Owen值满足的五个性质进行推广,并通过两个阶段的分配方法给出了限制Owen值的定义,说明限制Owen值满足可加性、有效性、联盟内部对称性、哑元性等性质.最后通过算例,对该模型的可行性进行分析.

In the framework of cooperative games with coalition structure, it studied the problem of profit allocation by introducing lattice structure based on the situation that all the coalitions are not feasible. First, it generalized five properties which Owen value satisfies and then gave the definition of restricted Owen value by two step allocation. It proves that Owen value satisfies some properties, such as additivity, efficiency, symmetric with coalitions, dummy player property and so on. Finally, it gave an example to verify the allocation method in the paper.