摘要
基于搜寻理论,探讨了网上交易平台向卖家和买家收费,对均衡价格水平和离散程度的影响,建立了单期博弈模型.运用最优化理论分别求得了仅向卖家收费和向卖家与买家都收费情况下的买家最优搜寻活动、均衡价格以及价格离散程度.研究表明:交易平台收费将导致买家减少搜寻活动;当交易平台仅向卖家收费时,两类卖家均提高定价,而随着收费金额的提高,网上交易市场中价格离散程度降低;当交易平台向卖家和买家同时收费时,高声誉卖家的定价降低,低声誉卖家的定价提高,市场均衡时,价格离散程度进一步降低,乃至消失.
Based on the searching theory, the paper constructs one period game model to examine the effects of platform charges on the equilibrium price and price dispersion in online markets where the sellers have ob- servable and heterogeneous reputations. We obtain the optimal searching activity, equilibrium price and the degree of price dispersion with optimal theory. The results show that the rise of platform charges from sellers in online markets reduces customers＇ searching activity, but raises the products＇ prices. In addition, the price dispersion degree reduces or even disappears at the time the platform charged from the sellers and customers since the directions of price changing are generally different for sellers with different reputations.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期1-9,共9页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972142)
关键词
平台收费
声誉
搜寻成本
价格离散
platform charges
reputation
searching cost
price dispersion
