摘要
为了分析低碳经济环境下环境监测部门与企业在节能减排技术改造过程中的博弈,假设博弈双方在有限理性条件下,建立了环境监测部门和企业在各自不同的策略选择时的成本和收益模型,运用进化博弈理论研究了博弈双方的稳定性策略。博弈分析结果表明:企业的技术改造成本和通过技术改造后为企业带来的收益、政府对企业是否进行节能减排技术的奖励和惩罚,以及环境主管部门的重视都将直接影响企业的行为选择。
To analyze the game process of the environmental monitoring departments and enterprises in the energy saving and emission reduction technological reconstruction process under the environment of low-carbon economy,it establishes the costs and benefits model in different strategy selection,by using the evolutionary game theory to study the stability strategy of two sides in game.The analytical results show that：all elements will affect the behavior selection of the company including the technological transformation cost of the enterprises,the benefits of technological reconstruction for enterprises,the reward and punishment depending on whether the company carrying out the energy saving emission reduction technology or not and the importance attached to the environmental authorities.
出处
《工业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期137-141,共5页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目批准号:09YJC630247)
重庆市社会科学规划青年项目(项目批准号:2011QNGL63)
重庆理工大学青年基金资助项目(项目编号:2010ZD10)
关键词
低碳经济
节能减排
技术改造
进化博弈
low carbon economy
energy saving and emission reduction
technical reconstruction
evolutionary game
