董事会勤勉、管理者过度自信与企业过度投资

Board Diligence,Managerial Overconfidence and Overinvestment

选取深沪A股上市公司2006-2010年数据为样本,对董事会勤勉及管理者过度自信与企业过度投资的关系进行理论与实证研究,分析了董事会勤勉对企业由于管理者过度自信所导致的过度投资的治理效应。结论表明:董事会勤勉与企业当年过度投资水平不存在显著相关性;董事会勤勉度的提高也不能改善企业下一年过度投资状况;管理者过度自信会引发企业过度投资;董事会勤勉对企业由于管理者过度自信所导致的过度投资没有显著治理作用。

Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2006 -2010, this paper examines the association of board diligence and overinvestment, and the relationship of managerial over- confidence and overinvestment, studies the governance effect of the board diligence to the overinvestment which caused by managerial overconfidence. The findings indicate that： board diligence has no obvious correlation to the current year＇ s level of corporate overinvestment, and can＇ t improve enterprise＇ s overinvestment situation of the next year. Managerial overconfidence triggers entrepreneurial overinvestment. The governance effect of board diligence on the overinvestment which is caused by managerial overconfidence is weak. The results enrich the theory of behavioral finance and corporate governance of domestic research, and provide a theoretical basis for the practice of business management.