论逻辑经验主义的意义标准

On Standard of Meaning to Logical Empiricism

意义标准问题是逻辑经验主义学派关心的核心问题之一,而意义标准最终集中在证实原则这个问题上。逻辑经验主义者们对于这个问题存在着广泛争论,并试图寻求解决途径,但无论如何努力,问题和挑战始终存在。文章通过论述逻辑经验主义学派的代表人物石里克、卡尔纳普和亨普尔对于意义标准的证实原则所作的不同解释和修改,认为一个陈述或理论的意义在其被表达或创造出来时就已经被人为地决定,按照人们表达或创造它时所遵守的规则,可分为有意义的和无意义的;而且,这个意义标准是相对的。

The standard of meaning is a central concern of logical empiricism,and it ultimately focuses on the problem of verification principle.There is extensive debate in logical empiricists about this problem;They were trying to find a solution to the way,but however hard the problems and challenges always exist.This paper discusses the different interpretations and revisions of representatives of logical empiricism about the verify principle such as Schlick,Carnap and Hempel,And at the end shows my own views on the problem： the meaning of a statement or theory in which it has just been stated or created has been artificially determined.And in accordance with the rules observed by people at the time of expressing or creating,can be divided into meaningful and meaningless;Moreover,in this sense the standard is relative.