中国的部门预算改革:一个官僚预算最大化的视角

China department budget reform: angle from bureaucratic budget maximization

本文运用尼斯坎南的官僚预算最大化模型对我国当前的部门预算改革进行分析,并得出结论:由于官僚机构具有预算最大化倾向,导致部门预算缺乏效率,如果不进行外在的政治制度改革,则部门预算改革将陷入泥潭。

Niskanen＇s Maximization of bureaucratic budget Model is applied to analyze the current department budget reform in China.it reaches a conclusion that department budget is inefficient because the bureaucratic institutions tend to maximum their budget.it is suggested an external political system reform is required to avoid that failure of department budget reform.