摘要
在克里普克那里,"跨界同一"与"本质"问题是等同的。克里普克预设了事物的本质,借以限制或者实现"可能世界"的可能性。他关于本质的论述背后隐藏着深刻的科学本位主义,甚至是严重的当代科学本位主义。克里普克的"本质"作为一种"到此为止"的本质,会导致"本质"消失的恶循环,即"克里普克循环"。其"同一"概念具有强烈的本质主义色彩,个体起源的充分非必要以及本质自身的不确定构成了"克里普克同一难题";从非本质的"样品"中提取出对象的本质是另一个难题,可以称之为"克里普克取样难题"。通过诉诸"本质"和"直指"解决个体跨界同一问题的路径是不能成立的,克里普克"可能世界"理论面临的困境为其缺陷的修正提供了"可能的"路径。
Possible worlds possess the characteristics of possibility,dependence and incompleteness, which results in the identity of transworld individual problem. Through analysis of individuals, natural kinds and the nature of scientific objects, the paper re- veals that there is even serious science-based parochialism hidden in the essence of Kripke's theory. By resorting to the "es- sence" and "rigid designator",Kripke failed to solve the transworld individual problem, which led to "Kripke Cycle"as well as "Kripke Sampling Problem".
出处
《山东科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
2012年第6期69-75,共7页
Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)