信息不对称条件下地方政府对能耗偏好性研究

A Study of Local Government's Preference for Energy-Consumption in Asymmetric Information

通过建立数理规划模型来研究信息不对称条件下地方政府对中央政府配置能耗指标所采取的策略,并利用无差异等效用能耗曲线和期望能耗曲线进行辅肋分析和研究。研究发现:在信息不对称条件下,各地方政府居于节能降耗任务的约束,高能耗省更有积极性模仿低能耗省,而为获取这一信息中央政府在把节能降耗总目标分解到各个省时不可避免要付出信息成本值,导致信息不完全对称条件下社会总产出值相对于完全信息下的社会总产出值要小的事实,而两者之间的差额正是中央政府必须要付出的信息成本值。

By establishing a mathematical programming model and with the aid of expected energy consumption curve and no-difference effective energy consumption curve,in this paper measures adopted by the local government were studied in reference to the configuration of the central government＇s energy consumption index in asymmetric information.The study has shown the fact that under the conditions of asymmetric information,and under constraint of the task of energy saving,high energy consumption provinces actively imitate the low ones.In order to obtain this information,when allocating the overall goal of saving energy to provinces,the central government has to pay the cost of information value unavoidably,which will result in the fact that the social total output value in asymmetric information is relatively less than that in symmetry information.And the very difference between them is the cost of information that the government must pay for.