论语句的涵义与指称——对弗雷格的涵义-指称理论的一些修正

On the Sense and Reference of a Sentence:Some Corrects of Frege's Theory of Sense-Reference

弗雷格把语句的涵义看作思想,把语句的指称看作真值。本文接受弗雷格关于语句的涵义—指称的意义结构,但把语句的涵义和指称分别改为语法意义和事态。语句的真或假是语句和它所指称的事态之间的一种关系,类似于名称同它的指称对象之间的实—空关系。弗雷格关于思想的客观性转换为语法意义的客观性,体现为语言共同体成员的主体间性。本文还区分了指称对象和指称意向,把指称意向定义为涵义和语境的结合,相当于弗雷格所说的判断。此外,本文对语句的语法意义和认识论意义作了区分。

Frege took the sense of a sentence to be thought and the reference to be truth-value. I will adopt the meaning structure of sense- reference of a sentence, while correct the sense and reference of a sentence as the grammatical meaning and state of affairs respectively. The truth or falsity of a sentence is a relation between the sentence and the state of affairs it refers to, like the relation of non-emptiness or emptiness between a name and its referent. The objectivity of thought in Frege＇s eyes transforms into the one of grammatical meaning that is embodied in the intersubjectivity among the members of a linguistic community. I also make the distinction between referent and referential intention, and the latter is defined as the combination of the sense and context that amounts to Frege＇s term ＇judgment＇ . Moreover, I make the distinction between granmmtical meaning and epistemological meaning.