基于两阶段道德风险模型的激励约束机制

The Incentive-restricted Mechanism Based on a Two-stage Moral Risk Model

在经典多阶段道德风险模型基础上,结合担保企业业务人员操作担保业务的实践,通过合理地引入Stevens和Thevaranjan(2010)的"道德敏感度"因子,构建了符合担保企业实际情况的两阶段道德风险模型,并运用数理分析方法揭示出各相关因素对担保业务经理激励强度的影响机制。在此基础上,根据数理模型提出了理论假设进行了实证分析,最后检验了回归模型的稳健性。研究表明:对于道德敏感因素,在两阶段,道德敏感度处于一定数值范围内时,则随着道德敏感度的增加,对业务经理的激励强度应递减;而在其范围之外,对业务经理的激励强度的变化并不确定的。此外,随着担保审核通过率、外部效应的增加,在两个阶段的激励强度均呈现正U型增减变化;而对于风险规避和担保风险的变化,在尽职调查阶段,随着风险规避度和担保风险的增加,激励强度的变化是不确定的;而在保后监管阶段,激励强度是随之增加而递减的。

Based on the classical multi-stage stage more moral risk model, and combined with practice that business personnel of guarantee enterprise operate guarantee business, this paper builds two stage moral risk model in accordance with the actual conditions of guarantee enterprise by introduced moral sensitivity factor （Stevens ~ Thevaranjan, 2010） properly, and it also reveals the mechanism of relevant factors＇ influence on the incentive intension of guarantee business manager from the point of mathematical analysis. Based on this,this paper puts forward the theoretical assumptions and make empirical analysis according to the above mathematical model, and finally inspects its robustness of regression model. Research shows that, for moral sensitive factors, during two stages, moral sensitivity will be in a certain value range , with the increase of moral sensitivity, the incentive strength to business manager should be reduced; And when outside of this range, the excitation intensity change to business manager is uncertain. In addition to this, with the security audit rate and outside effect increasing, the incentive intensity of two phases increases or decreases as significantly positive U shape. For risk aversion and guarantee risk, at the due diligence stage, with the risk degree and guarantee risk increasing, the change of the incentive intensity is uncertain, but the incentive intensity descends with its increasing at the removing guarantee stae.