“对事实不敏感”的正义原则——评柯亨对罗尔斯建构主义的批评

The Fact-insensitive Principle-on Cohen's Critique of Rawlsian Constructivism

作为当代西方马克思主义的代表人物,柯亨声称罗尔斯通过建构程序确立的正义原则不是根本的正义原则,因为它需要依赖普遍的事实,最根本的正义原则应当是"对事实不敏感"的运气平等主义。当前针对柯亨这一观点的批评主要强调"更为根本的原则可以是一种方法论的原则而非具有实质内容的规范原则"。本文力图证明:从这一角度给出的回应容易引发"规范"和"方法"的循环争论。实际上,柯亨是在逻辑的层面而不是在经验的层面坚持事实不敏感理论,他所理解的对事实不敏感原则在某种意义上依然是以事实为条件的。

As an influential representative of contemporary western Marxism, Cohen claimed that Rawls＇ justice principle should not be seen as a fundamental one,for the procedures the latter had designed to establish it have to depend on general facts. Luck egalitarianism is more funda mental in the sense that they are facts-insensitive. The chief emphasis of responses to Cohen＇s critique is that ＂the more basic principles could be methodological principles instead of normative ones which consist of substantive contents. ＂ However, arguments based on this position are prone to induce ever-cycling debates between ＂methodological＂ and ＂normative,＂ and we can give a defense from another perspective： Cohen insisted that what he explored is the logical structure of beliefs and that the fact-insensitive principle should be grasped at the logical rather than empirical level, but in fact he didn＇t carry through this proposition and the fact-insensitive principle he actually held is still facts-related in some way.