摘要
旁路攻击是一种通过分析密码设备在运行时所产生的旁路信息来分析该密码设备的秘密信息的方法。Paul Kocher等人在1998年提出的功耗分析现在已经是针对密码设备的旁路攻击中非常常见的一种。在硬件实现的密码设备中,双轨逻辑是一种有效的抵抗功耗分析的方法,它通过用两位物理比特来表示一位逻辑比特,使数据0和1的表述对称,从而平衡了功耗的大小。对于软件实现的密码设备,也可以借鉴双轨逻辑的思路,这里给出了一个较为完备的软件级双轨逻辑方案,解决了一些前人方案的不周全指出,并之后在一个DES算法的实验中,验证方案的有效性。
Power attack, proposed by Paul Kocher in 1998, is now a common kind of side channel attack on cryptographic devices. In the hardware implementation of cryptographic algorithms, dual-rail logic is a useful method to resist the power attack. With two physical bits for expression of one logic bit, the degree of power consumption is ballanced in the processing of different data. In the software implementation of cryptographic algorithm, the same thinking could be referred to. An even more complete proposal of dual-rail logic on software level in the software implementation of cryptographic algorithms is suggested in the paper, which could solve some indaequacies of the former proposals. An experiment in software DES indicates the effectiveness of the proposal.
出处
《通信技术》
2013年第4期1-4,共4页
Communications Technology
关键词
功耗分析
双轨逻辑
双轨编码
基本逻辑门
S盒
列混淆
power attack
dual-rail logic
dual-rail encoding＇ differential power attack＇basic logic gate＂ S-box
mix column
