摘要
在城市基础设施和公共交通发展仍然面临瓶颈的特定时期,容纳黑车有可能会成为政府的无奈之举。执法部门为了提高打击黑车的积极性,允许将罚款收入按照一定比例用于奖励执法人员。这样的机制设计,有可能使得执法部门的诉求由公共福利水平最大化偏离到部门利益最大化。
This paper analyses the stakeholders and the game mechanism of entrapment inci- dents. We model the case of gypsy cab from the view of game theory. While the urban transportation infrastructure is undeveloped, the existing of gypsy cabs can meet the residents' needs. If the gov- ernment allows its agents to share the penalty income, it is likely that the agents will be misled to fo- cus on how to maximize the penalty income instead of the social welfare.
出处
《南京社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期37-42,共6页
Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences
关键词
黑车治理
利益博弈
修正
improvement and rectification
game theory
correction