家族经营权涉入对经理人薪酬业绩敏感度的权变影响

The Contingency Influence of Family Management Involvement on Executive's Pay-performance Sensitivity

从家族经营权涉入的角度,考察不同治理问题情境下经理人薪酬业绩敏感度的差异。结果表明:在主要受第一类代理问题困扰的直接上市家族企业中,家族经营权涉入的退出,即家族企业职业化,对治理绩效有显著负面影响,反映为经理人薪酬业绩敏感度的降低。而在第二类代理问题相对严重的间接上市企业中,家族经营权涉入的加强,即公众企业家族化,也不利于治理绩效的好转,经理人薪酬业绩敏感度会随之降低。这说明,家族化与职业化在处理两类治理问题上的能力不同,家族化与职业化的选择应该权变而定。

This paper discusses governance performance of family business under the different listing channels from the perspective of family management involvement. The result shows that the quit of family management involvement in direct listing family business, namely professionalization, has negative effect which caused a decrease in the executive＇s pay-performance sensitivity, while strengthening the family man- agement involvement in indirect listing family business, namely familization, is also no good for governance performance for the same empirical approach. That means both familization and professionalization have dif- ferent capabilities to deal with two different types of the governance problems, so the option of familization or professionalization is based on different governance circumstances.