中国古代监察制度的启示与悖论——以《中国廉政史鉴》典章制度卷为视角

Enlightenment and Paradox of the Supervision System in Ancient China——From the Perspective of the Law System Volume in Reflection of Chinese Anti-corruption History

通过对《中国廉政史鉴》典章制度卷的梳理,我们可以看到中国古代监察制度表现出来的几个特点:监察权是治权之权,监察官是治官之官;监察与权力相伴而生;监察权是耳目之寄;国家要培养监察官的锐气;监察官有特殊的任职要求;监察必须保持充分独立。同时,我们也发现,中国古代监察制度依靠权力集中来制约权力,注定就是一个悖论,只要分权和民主还未得到启蒙,这个悖论就难以克服。了解这些,对于进一步完善当前的监察制度具有一定的启发意义。

By sorting out the law system volume in Reflection of Chinese Anti-corruption History, we can see the following features of the supervision system in ancient China： the power of supervision was the power to govern power and the censors were officials to govern other officials; supervision was associated with the power; the power of supervision depended on spying on others; a country should deveiop censors＇ brains and drive; there existed special requirements for censors; supervision should be kept fully independent. Meanwhile, we find that the supervision system in ancient China relied on the centralization of power to restrict power, which makes it destined to be a paradox. As long as the separation of powers and democracy haven＇t been enlightened, the paradox will be difficult to overcome. The knowledge about the supervision system in ancient China will exert some referential meanings upon the consummation of the present supervision system.