摘要
本文运用博弈论,分析地方政府在招商引资竞争中优惠政策的实施及对社会福利的影响,并就如何避免"囚徒困境"、促进合作提出对策建议。博弈模型表明,合作促进社会福利增加,恶性竞争导致内耗和互损。
By using game theory, the paper analyzes the implementation of preferential policies and the impact on social welfare during the competition of attracting investment among the local governments. Game model shows that cooperation can promote the growth of social welfare, vicious competition results in internal friction and in- ter-impairment. The countermeasure and advise are proposed on how to avoid the "Prisoner's Dilemma" and pro- mote cooperation.
出处
《科技广场》
2013年第2期159-162,共4页
Science Mosaic
基金
广西教育厅基金项目"桂东承接产业转移协作区的理论与实证研究"(编号:200911MS234)
广西高校"十一五"重点建设研究基地:粤港澳产业转移中心(批准号:桂教科研[2007]20号)
梧州学院基金项目"广西承接产业转移中利益主体博弈研究"(编号:2008C005)阶段性成果
关键词
地方政府竞争
博弈分析
招商引资
Competition Among Local Governments
Game Analysis
Attracting Investment