区域内地方政府间招商引资竞争的博弈分析

A Game Analysis of the Competition among Local Governments for Attracting Investment

本文运用博弈论,分析地方政府在招商引资竞争中优惠政策的实施及对社会福利的影响,并就如何避免"囚徒困境"、促进合作提出对策建议。博弈模型表明,合作促进社会福利增加,恶性竞争导致内耗和互损。

By using game theory, the paper analyzes the implementation of preferential policies and the impact on social welfare during the competition of attracting investment among the local governments. Game model shows that cooperation can promote the growth of social welfare, vicious competition results in internal friction and in- ter-impairment. The countermeasure and advise are proposed on how to avoid the ＂Prisoner＇s Dilemma＂ and pro- mote cooperation.