基于委托代理理论的突破性技术创新激励机制研究

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Breakthrough Innovation Based on the Principal-agent Theory

提出了创新刺激机制的框架,将'歹徒问题'嵌入代理人模型,研究突破性创新和渐进性创新的刺激机制.研究发现:执行突破性创新的最优契约对长期成功而非短期成功进行奖励,甚至可能对短期失败进行奖励.此外,突破性创新激励机制还包括持续坚持长期刺激计划,对工作表现进行及时反馈.具体措施包括'黄金降落伞'、管理防御,有利于债务人的破产法律保护等.

This paper proposes a framework of the incentive mechanism of innovation.The ＂bandit problem＂ is embedded into the principal agent model to study the incentive mechanism of radical innovation and incremental innovation.The study finds that the optimal contract that implements radical innovation rewards long-term success,but not short-term success.On the contrary,it may even reward short-term failure.In addition,incentive mechanism of radical innovation also includes persistent commitment to a long-term incentive plan,and timely feedback on performance.Specific measures include ＂golden parachute＂,managerial entrenchment,and legal protection of bankruptcy that is benefit for debtors,etc.