管理层权力、负债和企业价值

Management Power,Liability and Enterprise Value

选择中国深、沪A股上市公司2008年至2010年共3年的上市公司为初始样本,研究发现:管理层权力是加剧经理与股东代理问题,危害企业价值的重要因素,债务并没有沦为管理层权力控制下的产物,而是作为制衡管理层权力的一种约束力量存在。考虑产权因素,得到非国有企业的管理层权力要比国有企业的大,而从债务治理作用看,债务对预算软约束条件下的"代理成本"未能较好地发挥监督约束作用,但其并没有演进成为经理利用权力进行利益侵占的工具,在一定程度上限制了经理的腐败行为。在非国有企业中,债务的"硬"约束没有能够发挥治理作用。

This paper takes Shenzhen, Shanghai a-share listed companies from 2008 to 2010 as the initial sample. The results show that power management is an important factor which leads to agency problems between the managers and shareholders, and brings detriment to the enterprise value. Liability does not reduce to a product under the management of power and control, but exists as a binding force to balance the management of power. Considering the factors of property fights, we can draw the conclusion that the power of the management of non-state-owned enterprises is larger than the state-owned enterprises. From the perspective of the governance role of liability, liability does not play a supervisory role as regulating ＂agency costs＂ on the conditions of soft budget constraint. But it has not evolved into a tool that managers seek to embezzle benefits with their power. It instead limits, non-state-owned enterprises, the ＂hard constraints＂ of the role. to some extent, the managers＇ corruption. In liability have not been able to play a governance role.