下游竞争、买方谈判能力与上游产品差异化

Downstream Competition,Bargaining Power and Product Differentiation Strategy

基于零售商谈判能力的差异,构建完全信息动态博弈模型,考察下游竞争程度、买方谈判能力对上游产品差异化策略激励的影响。结果表明,下游市场竞争与买方谈判能力对产品差异化的激励不存在替代效应;当零售商不具有买方谈判能力时,市场竞争程度通过影响上游利润激励供应商的产品差异化策略,竞争程度不影响批发价格;当主导零售商具有买方谈判能力时,谈判能力通过影响批发价格激励供应商的产品差异化策略;市场竞争削弱了消费者效用水平,而买方谈判能力改善了消费者效用水平。

A completely dynamic game model is constructed to analyze the effect of competition in the downstream market and buyer bargaining power on product differentiation based on cooperative game between the upstream and downstream. The results show that the role of downstream market competition and buyer bargaining power can＇t be a substitute. When all retailers do not have bargaining power, the degree of competition in retail market affects product differentiation by influencing upstream profit. While one retailer has bargaining power, the bargaining power and degree of competition in retail market affect product differentiation by influen- cing the wholesale price. The degree of competition in retailers＇ market and buyer bargaining power cause the decline in the level of consumer welfare, while presenting a strategically complementary role.