外部监管对券商研究报告质量的影响分析——基于投研市场参与者的博弈视角

The Influence of the External Supervision on the Quality of Research Reports from Securities Companies:From the Perspective of Game of the Participants

券商研究报告是广大中小投资者投资决策的重要依据之一。质量偏低,预测精确度不高甚至虚假,会对投资者造成误导。若缺乏外部监管,仅仅依靠券商内部流程控制,并不能显著提高研究报告质量。本文引入外部监管,建立以券商、投资者和监管方的三方博弈模型,研究造成报告低质虚假的原因,并结合我国资本市场现状,提出相关对策和建议。

The securities research reports published by securities companies are one of the most important references for investors＇ decision. Investors can easily be misled by low-quality, less precise, or even false reports. The quality of securities reports could hardly been improved if only relying on self-control of companies themselves, without any external supervision. After introducing external supervision, this paper analyzed the influential factors of the quality of research reports through a static game theory model which includes investors, regulators and brokerage firms. Combining the situation of China capital market, the paper made some suggestions to improve the quality of research report published by securities companies.