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承发包双方之间的绩效奖励博弈模型分析

The analysis for the game model of performance incentives between contracting parties
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摘要 文章从博弈论的角度探讨了工程项目发包方与各个工程承包方(设计院、监理单位、施工单位等)的经济关系,试图利用绩效奖励模型来解释各方利益选择倾向的经济学根源。根据经济学公式推导的结果,从现实的角度提出切实可行的建议,供工程各方参考。 This article explores the economic relations among the employer and the various engineering contractors (the design institutes,supervision units,construction units) of project from the perspective of game theory,trying to take advantage of the performance incentive model to explain the choosing tendency of the economics of the interests of all parties. It puts forward the practical, proposals for engineering parties as reference from a practical point of view ~cording to economics formula derivation.
作者 程庆辉
出处 《企业技术开发》 2013年第3期93-94,共2页 Technological Development of Enterprise
关键词 博弈论 绩效奖励 工程承包方 game theory performance incentives engineering contractor
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