基于博弈论视角下的成都地票交易制度分析研究

Analysis and Research of Chengdu's Land Tickets Trading System Based on Game Theory

以成都市地票交易制度中各个利益主体为研究对象,基于博弈论的相关理论构建了开发商与开发商之间的博弈模型、开发商与地方政府之间的博弈模型和中央政府与地方政府之间的博弈模型。通过对以上三个博弈模型进行分析,结果表明成都市地方政府在选择自己的最优策略时并未充分考虑开发商和中央政府的利益是成都市地票交易被突然叫停的主要原因。最后,根据分析结果有针对性地提出了有利于成都市地票交易制度发展的建议,以期完善成都市地票交易制度并为国家统筹城乡发展提供参考。

Focused on various interest subjects in Chengdu＇s land tickets trading system, three game models are designed about developers and developers, developers and local government, central government and local government based on the related theory of game theory. Through the analysis of the above three game models, the results show that the interests of developers and central government are not fully considered in the optimal strategies chosen by the local government of Chengdu. And this is the main reason of Chengdu＇s land tickets trading system was stopped suddenly. Finally, the suggestions are put forward in order to benefit the reform of Chengdu＇s land tickets trading system, providing the reference for national urban and rural development.