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基于拍卖的P2P内容分发网络带宽分配机制 被引量:2

Auction based bandwidth allocation mechanism for P2P content distribution networks
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摘要 为了解决P2P内容分发网络中带宽资源稀缺且分配不合理这一突出问题,抑制节点的自私性行为,设计了一种基于拍卖的带宽分配机制。该机制通过上载带宽支付方式,迫使自私请求节点选择合适的带宽需求,使得整个P2P网络中的节点良性竞争带宽资源,避免了"公共地悲剧"的发生;且带宽分配算法在资源节点和请求节点并行执行,能很好适应P2P网络的分布式特性。仿真结果表明,该机制能够有效遏制搭便车行为,从而缩短P2P内容分发的平均完成时间,降低内容源服务器的上传数据比例。 Unreasonable allocation of originally scarce bandwidth was a severe problem in the P2P content distribution networks. To solve the problem and suppress the node's selfishness, an auction-based bandwidth allocation mechanism for P2P networks was proposed. Through the effective bandwidth payment scheme, the selfish nodes had no incentives to lie and provided the real bandwidth requirements. Also the "tragedy of the commons" could be avoided by the nodes' healthy bandwidth competition. To adapt to the distributednature of the P2P networks, the algorithm was implemented in parallel at resource providing nodes and request nodes. Simulation results show that the scheme not only suppresses free riding nodes efficiently in the system, but also shortens the average completion time for content distribution and de- creases the ratio of data uploaded by the source seFver.
出处 《通信学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2013年第4期99-105,共7页 Journal on Communications
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(61070170) 苏州市应用基础研究计划基金资助项目(SYJG09024) 东南大学计算机网络和信息集成教育部重点实验室开放研究基金资助项目~~
关键词 P2P内容分发网络 带宽分配 拍卖 分布式优化 P2P content distribution networks bandwidth allocation auction distributed optimization
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参考文献15

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二级参考文献8

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