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融资约束、高额现金持有和投资效率 被引量:25

Financing Constraint,High-scale Cash Holdings and Investment Efficiency
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摘要 引入投资机会集和产品市场竞争的概念,选取2006~2010年中国A股非金融类上市公司数据作为研究样本,分析了融资约束、高额现金持有和投资效率之间的关系。实证结果发现:融资受到约束的公司的现金持有率高于融资不受约束的公司,其现金持有量随着内部现金流的增加而增加;融资不受约束的公司,其现金持有量与内部现金流不敏感,此结论仅适用于企业按规模和所有权性质分组,不适用于企业按成长性和市场竞争程度分组;在高额现金持有下,融资约束较弱的公司的现金持有量越多,过度投资的可能性越大,融资约束可以缓解这一现象,融资约束较强的公司持有现金的目的则是为了抓住有利的投资机会。 Injecting the conception of investment opportunity set and product market competition, this paper examines the relationship between financing constraint, high-scale cash holdings, and investment efficiency using all A-share nonfinancial publicly traded companies in China for the period from 2006 to 2010. The author finds that cash ratios of companies with financing constraint are greater than those with nonfinancing constraint. The larger internal cash flow is the higher cash ratio is. However, this conclusion can only applicable to groups by scale and the nature of the ownership, not to groups by opportunity set and market competition; under high-scale cash holdings, those companies with the absence of financial constraint are faced with overinvestment, which can be reduced by financing constraint. However, the companies with financial constraint can catch more investment opportunities.
作者 张莉芳
出处 《山西财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第4期114-124,共11页 Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金 江苏省教育厅高校哲社基金项目"基于中国资本市场的董事会治理研究"(08SJD6300017)的阶段性成果 "江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目"(PAPD)的支持
关键词 高额现金持有 融资约束 投资效率 high-scale cash holdings financing constraint investment efficiency
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