长期导向对企业使用合同抑制渠道投机的影响

Impacts of Long-term Orientation on Contract Mechanism Curbing Channel Opportunism

文章以关系营销与营销渠道行为理论为基础,制造商与其经销商之间的关系为研究对象,检验了制造商的长期导向对其合同制订以及经销商投机行为的直接及交互影响。研究结果表明:企业的长期导向不但可以直接促进完备合同的制订,还会间接影响合同制订与投机行为之间的关系。其中,详细的交易条款对投机行为虽然无直接影响,但是会在与长期导向的交互影响下对投机行为产生作用。当企业的长期导向低的时候,详细的交易条款会抑制合作伙伴的投机行为;当企业的长期导向高的时候,详细的交易条款却会加重对方的投机行为。周全的意外处理条款则会对渠道投机行为产生直接的抑制作用,并且这种抑制作用会随着长期导向的增强而加强。

Based on the theory of relationship marketing and marketing channel behavior,this paper empirically tests the direct and interactive effects of manufacturers＇ long-term orientation on complete contract and the dealers＇ opportunism.It comes to the following conclusions： A firm＇s long-term orientation improves the completeness of a contract and influences the relationship between contract and opportunism.Although term specificity in a contract has no direct impact,it impacts opportunism under the interaction of long-term orientation.Term specificity inhibits opportunism when long-term orientation is at a low level,but it promotes opportunism when long-term orientation is at a high level.Contingency adaptability has a negative impact on opportunism and this negative relationship is enhanced as long-term orientation increases.