国有企业所得税与绩效目标的福利效应~①——基于数值模拟的分析

Welfare Effects of the Income Taxation and Performance Targeting for Chinese SOEs

本文结合国有企业的相对绩效考核机制,建立了一个包含国有企业在内多种所有制部门的开放经济模型,以考察国有企业所得税、绩效目标等外生政策调整的福利效应。数据分析结果表明,当国企相对业绩目标低于市场平均水平时,适度提高国企所得税税负可增进经济效率与社会福利,减轻税负将适得其反。因此,为应对2007年企业所得税改革对国企经营约束的放松,避免经济效率与社会福利损失,政府应提高对国企的绩效考核目标。

In order to assess the welfare effects of income taxation and relative performance valuation policies for SOEs, we construct a 4-sector open economy model including SOEs, and calibrate this model by Chinese data in 2007. Our resuits indicate that, higher tax burden of SOEs is welfare preferred if its performance target is lower than the market average. However, if tax burden across different ownership enterprises is equalized, the performance target of SOEs needs to be raised to compensate the welfare loss caused by the tax reduction of SOEs.