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内外部环境因素对公司投资行为影响及其效果的研究 被引量:1

Study on the Impact of Internal and External Environmental Factors on Corporate Investment and its Effect
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摘要 公司投资由成长性决定但受制于现金流。本文以A股上市公司(2002-2011)为样本,研究不同内外部环境下不同特质公司投资决策的差异及其对公司超额价值的影响。结果发现,公司投资不仅受现金流和托宾Q的影响,还受内外部环境的影响,投资有助于提升公司超额价值。考虑公司外部环境,货币政策越宽松,投资对现金流的依赖下降,而对成长性的依赖上升,投资带来的超额价值也越高;考虑公司内部环境,治理越好的公司,投资对现金流的依赖下降,对成长性的依赖上升,投资带来的超额价值也越高。细分公司特质后发现,市场化程度越高的公司投资对现金流的依赖越大;货币放松期相比货币紧缩期,市场化程度越高的公司投资对现金流依赖下降越明显,而对成长性的依赖上升也越明显,但是投资给市场化程度高的公司所带来的超额价值反而下降;无论公司特质,公司治理越好,投资对现金流的依赖下降,对成长性的依赖上升,并且投资带来的公司超额价值始终越高。 Corporate investment is decided by future growth opportunity but subjected to free cash flow. Using a sample of A-share listed corporate in China from 2002 to 2011, this paper attempts to study the investment decision of different corporate under different environments, and further analyzes the resulting effect. Empirical results show that corporate investment is determined not only by free cash flow and growth opportunity, but also by both the inner and outer environments. Corporate investment helps bring excess corporate value. During monetary expansion, corporate investment is more dependent on cash flow but less on growth opportunity and it helps bring more excess value. As corporate governance improves, corporate investment becomes less dependent on cash flow and more dependent on growth opportunity, and it helps bring more excess value. After taking into account firm types, corporate investment by firms with higher degree of market is more dependent on cash flow, especially during monetary contraction. But for these firms, corporate investment brings more excess value during monetary contraction than during monetary expansion. Regardless of firm types, as corporate governance improves, corporate investment becomes less dependent on cash flow and more dependent on growth opportunity, and better corporate governance always helps bring more excess value.
出处 《上海管理科学》 CSSCI 2013年第2期78-86,共9页 Shanghai Management Science
关键词 公司投资 现金流 托宾Q 货币政策 公司治理 公司超额价值 Corporate Investment Free Cash Flow Tobin's Q Monetary Policy Corporate Governance Excess Corporate Value
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