摘要
文献表明腐败通常会抑制一国的经济增长。然而,我国的现实是:GDP高速增长的同时伴随着较严重的腐败。已有研究认为晋升锦标赛是激励我国地方政府官员追求GDP增长的重要动力机制,在晋升锦标赛和财政分权下,我国的经济得以保持高速增长。晋升锦标赛会对地方政府官员的腐败行为产生影响吗?我们能否从晋升锦标赛与地方官员的腐败行为之间得出一些有意义的结论?为回答此问题,本文构建了一个数量模型。分析结果表明,在晋升锦标赛下:①职位薪酬只能在满足参与约束条件下起杜绝地方政府官员腐败的作用,而一旦地方政府官员决定腐败时,所谓的"高薪养廉"对降低地方政府官员的腐败程度作用甚微,真正起作用的是高低职位间的薪酬差。②地区间的增长条件差异、政治环境差异、反腐败的投入差异、司法的公正与透明度差异等因素会通过诸如"破罐子破摔效应"、"示范作用"、"大染缸效应"等方式对地方政府官员是致力于腐败还是致力于清廉产生重要影响。③当本地的增长条件优于竞争性地区,改善竞争性地区的条件有助于提高本地的经济增长;而当本地的增长条件劣于竞争性地区时,改善竞争性地区的条件将抑制本地的经济增长。因此,平衡地区差异,对于一国的经济增长而言是十分重要的。④在晋升锦标赛下,一地的官员想要拥有更高的升迁概率,必须致力于改善本地的增长条件,合理设计高低职位间的薪酬差,同时改善本地的政治清廉环境。
Literature shows that corruption will usually inhibit a country's economic growth. However, the reality of China is: rapid GDP growth coincided with serious corruption. The existing research think that the promotion tournaments in China is an important motive mechanism to incentive local government officials pursuiting of GDP growth, under the promotion tournaments and the, fiscal decentralization, China's economy maintains high-speed growth. Does the promotion tournaments influence corruption of local government officials? Whether can we get some significant conclusions from the promotion tournaments and constructs a quantitative model. the local officials' corruption? To Analysis results showed that, under answer this questions, this paper the promotion tournaments:①jobs pay only play the role to eliminate the corruption of local government officials under the conditions that it meets the participation constraint, but once the local government officials decide to corruption, the so-called "high-paying Honesty" have little role to reduce the extent of corruption of local government of- ficials, which really works is the pay difference between high and low positions. ②Meanwhile, differ- ences of growth conditions between regions, differences in the political environment, investment differ- ences of anti-corruption, differences of fairness and transparency in the administration of justice and other factors would play a significant impact on local government officials, make them commit to corruption, or committ to clean, through such mechanisms as "throw the handle after the blade effect", "demonstration effect", the "big dye vat effect" and etc. ③ When the local conditions better than the competition re- gion, improving the conditions of the competitive region helps to improve local economic growth ; and when the conditions of local region worse than competitive region, to improve the conditions of the com- petitive region's, the economic growthof local region will curb . Therefore, it is very important to balance the regional differences for the purposes of a country's economic growth. (~) in the promotion tournament, officials of one region want to have a higher probability of promotion, he must be committed to improving the local growth conditions, the level of rational design of the pay differential between jobs, and impro- ving the local political clean environment.
出处
《上海经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期3-14,38,共13页
Shanghai Journal of Economics
基金
湖南省教育厅课题(11C0562)
湖南科技大学博士启动课题(E51023)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
晋升锦标赛
地方政府官员
腐败
破罐子破摔效应
Promotion Tournament
Local Officials
Corruption
Effect of "Throw the Handle After the Blade "