组织冗余与我国民营上市企业风险投资:创始人控制的调节作用

Organizational Slack and Venture Capital Investments in Private Listed Companies in China: The Moderating Role of Founder Control

组织冗余对风险投资活动的作用机制目前尚不明晰,有必要结合具体情境进行讨论。文章利用我国147家民营高科技上市公司2008-2010年数据,考察了组织冗余与民营企业风险投资活动之间的关系以及创始人控制对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,组织冗余与民营上市公司风险投资活动之间呈"倒U形"关系,创始人及其家族控制显著促进了民营企业在风险投资活动上的冗余资源配置。文章研究结论表明,冗余资源对民营企业风险投资活动来说是一把"双刃剑",创始人及其家族对民营企业的心理所有权发挥了重要作用,使企业战略决策更具有长期导向性。

The effect of organizational slack on venturing activities is not clear currently, so it is necessary to discuss it under specific situations. Based on the data of 147 private high-tech listed companies from 2008 to 2010, this paper studies the relationship between organizational slack and venture capital investments in private listed companies and the moderating role of founder control in this relationship. It indicates that there is an in- verted U-shaped relationship between organizational slack and venture cap- ital investments in private listed companies and the control of the founder and his family significantly promotes the allocation of slack resources in ven- ture capital investments in private firms. The conclusions above-mentioned indicate that slack resources seem to be a double-edged sword as for venture capital investments in private firms, and the founder and his family play an important role in psychological ownership of private firms and make corpo- rate strategy decision-making more long-term-oriented.