公平偏好视角下风险投资双边激励机制研究

公平偏好普遍存在,在风险投资中若风险企业家受公平偏好影响,将会对其行为产生较大影响。将"公平偏好"融入到传统的风险投资双边道德模型,在研究风险投资家与公平偏好的风险企业家合作的情况下,设计更有效的双边激励机制。风险企业家嫉妒心理越强烈,风险投资家在风险投资合同将给予更多的产出份额以补偿竞争性公平偏好所带来的效用就越少。风险投资家的增值服务效率越高,风险投资家会要求的产出的份额就越多;风险企业家的创造能力越强,风险投资家提供给风险企业家的产出份额就越高。

With the prevalence of fairness preference, venture entrepreneurs tend to be affected by fairness preferences in venture investments, making a great impact on their behaviors. By integrating the ideal of fairness preference into the bilateral moral hazard model of traditional venture investments in the cooperation between venture capitalist and venture entrepreneur with fairness preference psychology, this paper designs a more efficient bilateral incentive mechanism. The stronger envy the venture entrepreneur has, the more production shares the venture capitalist will produce in the venture investment contract which compensates utility reduction caused by competitive fairness preference. If the value-added service efficiency produced by the venture capitalist is higher, the venture capitalist will be demanded to produce a more production shares. Meanwhile, if the creative ability of the venture entrepreneur is stronger, the venture capitalist will give a more production shares to the venture entrepreneur.