内部控制信息透明度与股权代理成本--基于A股主板制造业上市公司的经验证据

Information Transparency of Internal Control and Equity Agency Cost:Empirical Evidence from Main Board A-Share Manufacturing Company

内部控制信息披露与公司治理密不可分、双向互动,并对公司代理成本有直接的影响。本文通过构建内部控制信息透明度指标,考察了内部控制信息透明度对股东与管理层之间以及控股股东与中小股东之间两类股权代理成本的影响。研究发现:(1)内部控制信息透明度的加强有助于约束管理层的自利行为,从而抑制了第一类股权代理成本的产生;(2)内部控制信息透明度的加强可以约束控股股东的非经营性资金占用。

The information disclosure of internal control and corporate governance are inseparable with a two-way interaction, as information disclosure has a direct impact on corporate agency costs. By building the indicator to measure the transparency of the internal control disclosure, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of the internal control information and two types of equity agency costs： shareholders versus management, and controlling shareholders versus minority sharehold- ers. We find that：（1）the transparency of internal control information can constrain the selfish behavior of management, thus de- creasing the generation of the first kind of equity agency costs; （2） the transparency of internal control information can con- strain the controlling shareholders＇ business accounting section.