摘要
CEO在并购中的寻租动机以及国企与民企是否存在差异的研究,对上市公司治理结构改进、薪酬契约设计以及如何治理民企和国企CEO的寻租行为具有重要理论指导意义。本文通过对2002至2012年发生并购的我国上市公司进行分样本检验,以期研究CEO在并购中获取薪酬、寻租收益和构建"管理帝国"大厦的权力寻租行为,以及国企和民企CEO在并购过程中寻租的差异。研究发现:(1)并购给CEO带来了更高的奖金、薪酬、寻租收益和管理权力等私利;(2)CEO权力寻租的结果是提高了自己的薪酬和寻租收益;(3)权力在企业并购、获取私利过程中起了关键作用;(4)民企CEO更偏好显性的货币性薪酬,国企CEO更偏好权力的提升和隐性的寻租收益。
Researching on the CEO rent-seeking motives and the differences between state-owed and private enterprises in the acquisition has important theoretical meaning for improving corporate governance structure and compensation design and the governance of CEO rent-seeking behavior.Combined with CEO compensation and rent-seeking,this paper tested the relationship between CEO bonus of MA,CEO compensation,CEO power with acquisition of China listed companies from 2002 to 2012.The results show that the CEO MA bonuses,CEO compensation and manage power have positive correlation with acquisition,and the efforts degree of MA deal,and the more power the CEO has,the more rent-seeking benefit the CEO has.CEO has the opportunism of rent-seeking by power to increase compensation,power and rent-seeking benefit through MA.The authors find that CEOs of private enterprises prefers dominant monetary compensation,but CEOs of the state-owned enterprises prefer power upgrading and rent-seeking income.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期81-93,共13页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家教育部项目"企业并购整合风险的生成机理
预警机制与治理策略研究"(12YJA630181)
