资本农场的制度逻辑

Institutional Logic of the Capital Farms

根据TCE和GHM理论,应该将农场所有权界定给专用性资产投资人,以监督其他契约方机会主义行为。因此,应该选择资本农场。然而,资本农场无法准确计量雇佣劳动边际贡献,具有较高雇佣交易成本。依据Hansmann企业所有权理论,资本农场制度成本较高而制度效率较低。因此,按照效率原则,应该淘汰资本农场。现实中,资本市场处于求大于供非出清状态,而劳动市场处于供大于求非出清状态,造成农场更加依赖于资本而非劳动。根据卢周来讨价还价模型,相对劳动,资本具有较高讨价还价能力,从而拥有农场所有权。因此,存在一定数量资本农场。

According to TCE and GHM theory, farms should give its ownership to its investors of the specific assets, so as to oversee the opportunistic behavior of the other contracting parties. Hence they should become the capital farms. However, the capital farms could not accurately measure the marginal contribution of each farmer employed. Based on the Hansmann corpo- rate ownership theory, they have higher labor transaction costs. It resulted in higher institutional costs and lower institutional effi- ciency. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of efficiency, the capital farms should fall into disuse. In reality, capital mar- kets were almost in the non-clearing states of demand exceeding supply, while labor markets were in the non-clearing states of oversupply. On Lu Zhoulai bargaining model, relative to the labor, the capital had a higher bargaining power, which made it hold the farm ownership. Therefore, there are a certain amount of capital farms in reality.