制造业组织冗余、两职兼任与企业绩效——基于中国上市面板数据的实证研究

Organizational Slack of Enterprise in Manufacturing Industry,Duality and Performance——An Empirical Analysis Based on the Panel Data of the Chinese Listed Company

制造业作为中国的支柱产业,在温州债务危机爆发后,为制造业"输血"的呼声不绝于耳,政府及银行也相继展开救助。然而资源增加后难以避免的组织冗余对企业绩效有何影响?当前国内外对两者关系的研究并不一致。因此,本文以制造业为对象,结合代理理论和管家理论,以管理者两职兼任为情境变量,研究了组织冗余与企业绩效的关系。通过2001～2010年10年的上市公司面板数据对理论假设进行检验,实证结果表明:对于制造业企业而言,在一般情况下,组织冗余对企业绩效有负面影响,支持了代理理论的观点;但是对于管理者两职兼任的企业而言,企业代理效应受到更多约束、组织理论所支持的组织冗余正面效应更加凸显,组织冗余与企业绩效两者之间的负向关系被弱化。本文在增加相关理论研究结论的同时,也对当前制造业"输血"救助行动提供了建议。

As the pillar industry, manufacturing industry needs more resource salvation in China after the debt crisis of Wen Zhou. The goverranent and the Banking are also canting out salvage operation. But the organizational slack will emerge unavoidable after the resource increase and the influence of organizafional alack to the performance is still unknown. Combine with the theory of stewardship and agency, this paper discusses the relationship of organizational slack and performance in manufacturing industry, including the moderating effect of duality. Using the panel data of listed company from 2001 to 2010, we test the hypothesis and find that the organizational slack has negative effect on performance in manufacturing industry, which support the viewpoint of agency theory. But in the enterprise of duality, the agency problem receives more restraint and the positive effect of organizational slack highlights. The negative relationship between organizational slack and performance is weakened. This paper deepens the research of related theory and provides suggestions to salvation of manufacturing industry.