配股后业绩下滑与真实活动盈余管理的相关性研究

The Relation between Declined Performance after Rights Issue and Real Activities Manipulation

本文以我国1997-2009年成功实施配股的549家A股上市公司为样本,从真实活动盈余管理的角度,实证检验了公司为达到证监会的配股资格线,是否进行了盈余管理,以及此行为对公司配股后的经营业绩所产生的影响。研究结果表明,上市公司在配股前确实进行了真实活动盈余管理,且此行为与公司配股后的业绩显著负相关。

This paper aims to do some empirical research to figure out whether managers manipulate real activities to meet the rights issue threshold,and the consequence of such behavior from the point of real activities manipulation（RM）,with the evidence from 549 listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange during the year of 1997 and 2009.The empirical research proves that managers really engage in RM to meet rights issue threshold before rights issue,which is negatively related to the subsequent performance.