博弈视角下供应链信息共享的利益协调机制研究

A Game Perspective on Mechanism of Benefit Coordination in Supply Chain Information Sharing

从博弈论的视角,通过构建供应链企业之间的非整体和整体信息共享博弈模型,并对其进行定量分析,研究了供应链信息共享机制,最后通过收益分配方法定量研究信息共享的收益分配机制。通过研究发现,一次整体信息共享博弈的前提是企业的信任,而在供应链整体信息共享的条件下,任何一个企业在自身平均成本曲线的最低点所在的信息量越大,则它就更愿意共享信息,最终达成信息共享利益协调。

In this paper, from a game perspective, we established the holistic and non-holistic information sharing game model among supply chain enterprises, analyzed it quantitatively, studied the mechanism of supply chain information sharing, and at the end subjected it to a quantitative analysis using the benefit sharing method. Through the analysis, we found that the prerequisite for once-off holistic information sharing was the trust of the enterprises while under the condition of the holistic information sharing of the supply chain, the greater the information load of the average cost curve at the lowest point for an enterprise, the more willing the enterprise was in information sharing.