摘要
波普尔的3个世界理论是其重要的思想遗产,莱文森对这一理论的修正揭示了技术的本质——技术是思想的物质体现,从而使技术独享本体论的地位。莱文森的修正得失皆有,很难说他们两人的"三界"图式孰高孰低。莱文森修正的重点是对世界3的重新定义与界说,即把波普尔的心智层面的客观知识,改造为物质层面的技术,两人的差异亦由此彰显:波普尔的世界3最终仍然落实到精神范畴,是他本属精神范畴的世界2的延伸,是知识本体论,而莱文森的世界3最终落实到的却是物质范畴,是他本属物质范畴的世界1的延伸,是技术本体论。这反映了他们各自持守的哲学传统在如何看待精神与物质的关系上两种根本对立的立场。波普尔的知识本体论主要继承了柏拉图的理念论传统,莱文森的技术本体论则主要继承了亚里士多德的实在论传统。
Popper＇s ＂three worlds＂ schema is his important ideological heritage and Levinson＇s revision to this schema reveals the nature of technol- ogy： it is an embodiment of ideas. Thus, technology could exclusively has its ontological status. Levinson＇s revision shares gains and losses and it is hard to say which one is better between the ＂three worlds＂ schemas of Levinson＇s and Popper＇s. Levinson＇s key revision refers to a redefinition of Popper＇s ＂world 3＂, namely transform Popper＇s objeetive knowledge in mind as technology in matter, so that the difference of the two schemas have become evident. Popper＇s ＂world 3＂ finally pertains to the mind category and is the extension of his ＂world 2＂ so that it is an ontology of knowledge, while Levinson＇s＂world 3＂ finally pertains to the matter category and is the extension of his ＂world 1＂ so that it is an ontology of technology. This re- flects their different philosophical traditions which are opposite on how to view the relations of mind and matter. Popper＇s knowledge ontology princi- pally inherits the tradition of Plato＇s idealism while Levinson＇s technological ontology primarily inherits the tradition of Aristotle＇s realism.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期105-110,共6页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
