产品市场竞争、高管持股与管理层盈余预告

Market Competition,Executive Shareholding and Management Earnings Forecasts

内容提管理层是上市公司盈余预告的执行者,管理层动机会对盈余预告产生直接影响;而产品市场作为重要的外部环境,也会一定程度上影响公司信息披露决策。从信息披露的成本一收益视角出发,可将管理层盈余预告从特征区分为收益型和成本型,在此基础上考察管理层高管持股与盈余预告质量之间的关系;并进一步按照产品市场竞争程度的高低进行分组,检验产品市场竞争对两者关系的影响。研究发现,高管持股会提高盈余预告收益型特征(及时性和准确性)的质量,但是会降低成本型特征(具体性)的质量;激烈的产品市场竞争下,高管持股公司的盈余预告收益型特征的质量没有变化,但成本型特征的质量会显著下降。研究结果丰富了管理层盈余预告的影响因素研究,为高管激励和产品市场竞争对公司信息披露的影响提供了新的证据。

Management, as the executive of earnings forecasts, whose motive may directly affect the earnings forecasts. In addition, the product market may also influence the information disclosure decisions as one of the important external environment. Based on the view of cost - benefit of information disclosure, this paper analyzes the effects of management shareholding on the management earnings forecasts by classifying the characteristics of earnings forecasts into income - oriented and cost - oriented. And further tests the influence of competition in product market on the relations between management shareholdings and earnings forecasts. The empirical results show that level of management shareholdings can significantly increase the quality of income - oriented characteristics （ forecast horizon and accuracy） of management earnings forecasts ; and decrease the quality of cost - oriented characteristic （ form and specific）. In addition, the result indicate that intense competition of the product market would worsen the association between management shareholding and cost - oriented characteristic of earnings forecasts. These results may enrich the determinants studies on management earnings forecasts, and provide some new evidence on the influence of management shareholding and market competition on information disclosure.