信息披露质量、代理成本与企业融资约束——来自深圳证券市场的经验证据

Information Disclosure Quality,Agency Cost and Financial Constraints——Empirical Evidence from Shenzhen Securities Market

信息不对称和代理成本是融资约束产生的原因,而信息披露质量对于信息不对称和代理成本有着重要影响。本文利用深圳证券交易所2007～2011年上市公司的数据,实证分析了信息披露质量与融资约束的关系。结果显示:信息披露质量的提高可以减轻企业的信息不对称程度,并降低企业的代理成本;企业普遍存在融资约束现象,但信息披露质量的提高能够显著缓解企业的融资约束。

The reasons of financial constraints are asymmetric information and agency costs, and information disclosure quality has an important impact on them. Taking listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 20111 as sampies,this paper analyzes the relationship between information disclosure quality and financial constraints. Empirical results show that improving the quality of information disclosure can reduce the degree of information asymmetry and agency costs. There was a widespread phenomenon of financial constraints in the corporate. For the enterprise with higher disclosure quality, its financial constraints is far less than the enterprise with lower quality of information disclosure.