摘要
审计收费中的最终价格确定是审计双方博弈的结果。使用双边随机边界模型分析框架分析审计收费中的定价,以及审计双方议价能力对审计定价的影响。结果发现:事务所的议价能力使得审计收费比理论均衡价格高出大约24.02%,上市公司的议价能力使得审计收费比理论均衡价格低了大约17.29%,两者的最终博弈结果使得中国审计收费比均衡价格高大约6.73%,中国事务所审计收费存在一定的高收费现象,事务所对大规模企业有收费溢价,2006年后,国际四大事务所存在高收费溢价现象。
The determine of the final audit fees is the game outcome by both sides of the audit. This article analyze the pricing of audit fees and the bargaining power impact on audit fee by uses of the analytical framework of bilateral stochastic frontier model, the results show that, the firm's bargaining power makes the audit fee to about 24. 02% higher than the theoretical equilibrium price, the bargaining power of the listed company make the audit fee lower about 17.29% than the theoretical equilibrium price, the final game result is our audit fees about 6. 73% higher than the equilibrium price. There is a certain high fees phenomenon in our listed audit fees, the audit firm charges a premium for large-scale enterprise. After 2006, there are high charges premium by the top four major international audit firms.
出处
《统计与信息论坛》
CSSCI
2013年第5期81-87,共7页
Journal of Statistics and Information
关键词
审计定价
议价能力
双边随机边界模型
audit pricing
bargaining power
bilateral stochastic frontier model