摘要
通过建立静态博弈模型,以实现帕累托改进为目标,对当前颇受争议的煤炭价格调节基金征收机制进行了深入的探究。研究发现,煤炭价格调节基金虽不能在短期内实现对煤炭价格的有效调节,但其在保证代内各地区间资源价值有序开发,代际间利益均衡调配,以及国家实现资源战略性储备与可持续发展等市场宏观调控方面具有积极有效的作用。
To reach Pareto Improvement, this essay based on static game theory models researches on the critically debated regulation price funds of coal price regulation fund collection mechanism in depth. In this research, although coal price regulation fund can not realizes effective regulation of the coal price in short time period, it ensures orderly development and interest equilibrium allocation in a generation, positive and effective effect in macro aspect on national strategic resource reserves and sustainable development and so on.
出处
《中国煤炭》
北大核心
2013年第5期11-14,91,共5页
China Coal
关键词
帕累托改进
煤炭价格调节基金
利益均衡
Pareto Improvement, coal price adjustment fund, balance of interests
