中国干部管理体制减少了地方政府教育支出吗?——来自省级官员的证据

Does China's Cadres' Management System Lead to Less Educational Spending?——Evidence from Provincial Data

主要分析了中国的干部管理体制对于地方政府教育支出的影响。文献通常认为,由于教育对官员晋升没有直接帮助,干部管理体制下的地方官员会忽视教育支出,却未提供严格经验证据。本文基于1995—2008年的省级数据发现,省长的任期和常务副省长的年龄与教育支出比重负相关;中央的任命、轮转和兼职等集权措施也使得来自中央的省委书记和省长的教育支出高于他人;来自本地的书记和省长的教育支出低于他人;我们没有发现干部管理体制减少教育支出的证据。这些结果表明,干部管理体制总体上有利于增加教育支出。主要原因在于,中央政府通过法律法规强调了教育的重要性,并限制了地方在教育支出上的自主权,从而改变了地方官员固有的忽视教育的偏好,使得他们重视教育。本文还显示,省级官员尤其是省长有能力干涉地方的财政支出过程。

This paper discusses the effects of China's cadres' management system on local educational expenditures.Although many literatures argue that the system leads to less educational spending,they fail to provide hard evidence.Estimating results from provincial data of 1995-2008 find that provincial party secretaries and governors who come from central government spend more money on education than others;and those who come from local will have less educational expenditures than others.Meanwhile,governors' tenure and associate governors' age have significant negative effects on local educational spending.Those results suggest that China's cadres' management system actually leads to more educational expenditures.In fact,as central government places great importance on education expenditures,local cadres have to value them.Finally,the paper also proves that provincial leaders,especially governors have great impact on local budget.