拟态式蜜罐诱骗特性的博弈理论分析

Game Theoretic Analysis for the Feature of Mimicry Honeypot

该文基于非合作不完全信息动态博弈理论,形式化描述了拟态式蜜罐诱骗博弈的各局中人策略和收益,构建了诱骗博弈收益矩阵,推理分析了拟态式蜜罐诱骗博弈中存在的贝叶斯纳什均衡策略,通过进一步讨论博弈均衡条件和影响因素并与传统蜜罐博弈相比较,给出了拟态式蜜罐模型中保护色、警戒色等机制在诱骗博弈中的适用条件,证明了拟态式蜜罐模型具有更好的主动性、有效性和迷惑性。

This paper firstly gives the formalization description of both players’ strategies and payoffs in the mimicry honeypot game,and constructs the payoff matrix of the fraudulent game using non-cooperative and incomplete dynamic game theory.Then the equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium conditions are inferred.The equilibrium conditions and relative factors are discussed in detail,and the comparison to traditional honeypot is also performed.The theoretic analysis depicts the effective condition for protective coloration and warning coloration mechanism in the fraudulent game,and demonstrates that the mimicry honeypot has better activeness,efficiency and fraudulence than the traditional scheme.