基于资产负债结构视角的合作金融组织模式及边界

Organization Mode and Scope of Cooperative Finance from the Perspective of Assets and Liabilities Structure

本文基于合作金融的定义及国际发展经验,从资产负债结构的角度出发,通过合作金融成员收益最大化模型对合作金融的组织模式、资产负债业务的开放程度以及合作金融的定价特征进行研究。研究结果表明,合作金融与股份制金融组织的区别在于借款人剩余与投资者剩余的权衡,借款人与股东成员身份完全重合的金融组织具有经典意义上的合作金融特征;随着成员规模的扩大和金融业务范围的开放,若合作社成员的投资者身份与借款人身份出现分离,最终将导致合作金融向投资者主导的股份制、商业性金融发展演化。

Based on the concept of cooperative finance and experiences of other countries in this regard, the paper analyses the organization mode, the openness of assets and liabilities business and the features of pricing behaviors of cooperative finance by maximizing the profits of their members. The result shows that the significant difference between cooperative finance and shareholding finance is the equilibrium between borrowers and investors. If a financial organization＇s shareholders are also the borrowers, it has the typical characteristics of classic cooperative finance. As the members increase and business scope expands, the cooperative finance finally transforms into investor-dominated shareholding and commercial finance on condition that the members have the statues as investors but not the borrowers.