摘要
开发者负担制度作为美国土地规制政策中的重要规制工具,其实现了公共建设任务由国家转移至私人开发主体的制度功能。但是,从司法审查的角度而言,开发者负担制度尽管具备诸多规制国家层面下的制度优势,其将国家义务强制转移至私人的制度特征,却可能触动联邦以及各州宪法中的"公共补偿条款",从而构成一种"规制性征收"。据此,联邦最高法院通过诸多判例生成的标准,亦旨在拘束开发者负担制度这一规制政策的过度影响。通过考察,实践中这些过度形式化的司法标准并未产生预期的效果,况且考虑州层面民主过程对开发负担政策的立法拘束,地方竞争压力的替代性拘束效果等等,诸多因素的叠加将使得司法对于地方土地规制政策的过分拘束显得十分突兀,并且放置于现代规制国家的大背景下,司法审查在其中扮演的制度角色远没有预想中的那般重要。通过对美国开发者负担土地政策的梳理,也为当代中国公共设施配建政策的完善,提供了比较法上的借鉴意义。
As one of the most important instruments of American land use regulation policy in mid-late 20th century, Land use exactions did serve its institutional function of unloading public infrastructure responsibility from state to private developer, while this institutional function, in spite of its various institutional edges under regulatory state, might violate the Just Compensation Clause of federal Constitution thus could be viewed as a kind of regulatory taking. So the judicial standards set by Supreme Court are meant to curb the land use exaction policy from wandering too far away. Later observation, however, reveals that these judicial standards failed to meet the expectations in practice, and the over-restriction on local land regulatory policy seems to be uncalled for, considering judicial restrict on land use exaction from democratic process at state level and alternative restrict from local competition pressure. Besides, the institutional part of judicial review is far less significant than perceived when we place it on a broader background of modern regulatory state.
出处
《环球法律评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期118-131,共14页
Global Law Review
基金
上海市哲学社会科学规划课题"给付行政背景下中国住房保障法律制度研究"(课题批准号:2011BFX008)的阶段性研究成果